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Despite much theoretical attention to the concept of procrastination and much exploration of this
phenomenon in laboratory settings, there remain few empirical investigations into the practice of
procrastination in real world contexts, especially in the workplace. In this paper, we attempt to fill these
gaps by exploring procrastination among U.S. patent examiners. We find that nearly half of examiners’
first substantive reports are completed immediately prior to the operable deadlines. Moreover, we find a
range of additional empirical markers to support that this “end-loading” of reviews results from a model
of procrastination rather than various alternative time-consistent models of behavior. In one such
approach, we take advantage of the natural experiment afforded by the Patent Office’s staggered
implementation of its telecommuting program, a large-scale development that we theorize might
exacerbate employee self-control problems due to the ensuing reduction in direct supervision. Supporting
the procrastination theory, we estimate an immediate spike in application end-loading and other indicia
of procrastination upon the onset of telecommuting. Finally, contributing to a growing empirical literature
over the efficiency of the patent examination process, we assess the consequences of procrastination for
the quality of the reviews completed by the affected examiners. This analysis suggests that the primary
harm stemming from procrastination is delay in the ultimate application process, with rushed reviews
completed at deadlines resulting in the need for revisions in subsequent rounds of review. Our findings
imply that nearly 1/6 of the annual growth in the Agency’s much-publicized backlog may be attributable
to examiner procrastination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A large body of literature has theorized that economic actors may counterproductively delay—
i.e., procrastinate—on tasks that they had previously agreed to undertake. This lapse in selfcontrol is often thought to stem from models of individual decisionmaking that involve either
salience costs—e.g., differential discount rates applied to the costs and benefits of tasks—or
present-biased preferences—e.g., higher discount rates applied to the short term versus the long
term (Akerlof 1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Consider for instance, a scholar who agrees
to review a paper for an academic journal. When she accepts the assignment, the benefits from
the work may appear to outweigh the costs. However, as the time nears to complete the referee
report, the costs take on an enhanced degree of saliency in the eyes of the reviewer, causing her to
deviate from her initial plans to commence work (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002).
While the concept of procrastination has been the subject of various empirical studies to date,
this empirical literature faces several limitations. To begin, documentation of present bias and
time-inconsistent behavior has largely focused on decisions that are more personal in nature. Very
few studies have explored these phenomena in the workplace.

Second, the literature has

predominantly drawn its insights from laboratory settings. Surprisingly little work has been done
to explore procrastination of real world tasks, especially those performed by high skilled laborers.
Finally, and critically, few investigations into the presence of procrastination have addressed the
impacts of such behavioral tendencies on the quality of the tasks ultimately performed.
In this paper, we begin to fill these gaps in the literature by exploring the behaviors of a particular
set of high-skilled laborers: patent examiners at the United States Patent Office. Charged with
assessing the patentability of claimed inventions, patent examiners perform tasks of substantial

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888061

import to innovation policy and economic growth.1 Commentators have expressed growing
concerns that the Patent Office is failing to provide high quality review of patent applications,
implicating significant social welfare harms (e.g., Lemley and Sampat 2012, Frakes and
Wasserman 2017a, Frakes and Wasserman 2015). Among these concerns are the harms stemming
from allegedly rampant examiner procrastination, a topic that has been the subject of two recent
reports by the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Commerce (OIG). These reports
provide some limited statistics demonstrating that patent examiners frequently “end-load” their
reviews—i.e., submit a high volume of work product immediately before deadlines (OIG Report,
2015; OIG Report, 2014). The OIG reports surmised, without offering supporting analysis, that
end-loading was caused by examiner procrastination and that this practice may be negatively
impacting the work product of the Agency. In this paper, we build upon the OIG reports by
systematically demonstrating the full extent to which examiners end-load their work efforts.
Moreover, we move beyond the OIG reports by setting forth a range of additional findings that
suggest that these practices are indeed a reflection of examiner procrastination and that speak to
the effects of such procrastination on examination quality.
This attempt to document evidence of patent examiner procrastination confronts serious
empirical challenges. First and foremost, finding evidence of employee procrastination requires
information capable of establishing a proper benchmark—i.e., some sense of the timeline that a
rational, time-consistent worker would follow in completing her work. Not only is it difficult to
acquire systematic and easily quantifiable data on the work efforts of individual employees and on
the timing of completion of the tasks that they perform (in addition to the quality of their
performances), it is rare to find systematic information necessary to construct the no-
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On the more general topic of the significance of patent rights for the direction of economic growth, see Moser (2005).
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procrastination counterfactual. In the present analysis, we establish this basis of comparison by
taking advantage of the rigid quota system that examiners must follow every bi-week.
Though quotas themselves are devices that are implemented, in part, to curb procrastination
tendencies, we embrace the implemented quota to test for some residual degree of procrastination
among actual examiners. In essence, while a non-procrastinating examiner would be expected to
spread her work equally (roughly) over the relevant period of time, a procrastinating examiner that
is nonetheless motivated to hit her production target might tend to cluster her examinations at the
end of the quota period. The degree to which examiners cluster their reviews in this manner may
thus illuminate the degree of time inconsistency in examiner work effort.
Drawing on a novel dataset consisting of application-level data on nearly 2 million patent
applications filed over a 10-year period, with information on the precise timing—to the day—of
the numerous actions that examiners take, we follow this approach and find substantial evidence
of examination bunching around quota-period ends. We focus our analysis on the key component
of examiners’ bi-weekly quota: the examiner’s first substantive decision regarding the patentability
of the claimed invention, known as the first office action on the merits. We find that roughly half
of first office actions are completed and processed on the last day of the quota period.
We acknowledge that end-of-quota bunching of work product alone may accord with various
time-consistent theories of behavior—e.g., application sorting—as distinct from true
procrastination. We take a range of steps to help mediate the possible causes of this end-loading
of examinations. For instance, as one might predict under a model of procrastination, we find
evidence that examiners begin to end-load their applications at notably higher rates immediately
upon their commencement of the Agency’s much-publicized telecommuting program, a shift in
their working environments that was implemented in a staggered manner and that removes one of
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the most common mechanisms to dealing with self-control problems among workers—i.e., inperson monitoring by supervisors.2 In addition, and perhaps most importantly, we theorize various
ways in which procrastination by examiners may impact the quality of their reviews—that is, we
theorize outcomes that derive only from models of time inconsistency.

We support a

procrastination explanation for the observed end-loading of application reviews by, in turn,
presenting evidence consistent with these theorized outcomes.
Critical to this examination quality analysis is the prediction that applications being processed
at quota ends—given the limited number of hours in a day—will receive less attention per
application than those processed in the interim periods. In the face of this rush, we theorize that
examiners will proffer a quick and low-quality—a.k.a., “shotgun”—rejection on the first office
action, regardless of the underling validity of the application. Examiners may opt for a quick
rejection over a quick, ill-conceived allowance considering that first-office-action rejections are
non-final in nature. That is, lacking the time to complete a thorough substantive review at the
present, examiners may buy themselves time to provide this thorough review at a later date by
rejecting the application now. In contrast, examiners do not have the chance to correct an improper
allowance, an outcome that could compromise their performance reviews.
Consistent with this prediction, we find the rate of allowance on the first office action is
drastically lower for those applications reviewed near the deadline. Moreover, our evidence
suggests that applicants are able to overcome such “shotgun” rejections and that examiners are
ultimately able to find time at a later date to review applications with nearly the same degree of
scrutiny and care they apply to those applications initially reviewed in the middle of a quota period.

2

Though we largely approach this telecommuting experiment in an effort to help assess the presence of self-control
problems by patent examiners, this analysis also allows us to contribute to the growing literature on the productivity
implications of telecommuting programs (Bloom et al. 2015).
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Beyond supporting a time-inconsistent interpretation of the observed end-loading of reviews,
this “shotgun”-rejection analysis is valuable insofar as we place independent importance on
understanding the quality of the patent examination process. As such, our analysis not only begins
to fill gaps in the behavioral and personnel economics literatures but also contributes to the nascent
literature on the determinants of patent examiner behaviors and on the resulting welfare
implications.3 Ultimately, our analysis suggests that the immediate consequence of procrastination
by examiners appears to be an increase in application processing time stemming from the need in
subsequent rounds of review to make up for the “shotgun” rejections issued on end-loaded
applications in earlier rounds. Examination delays may interfere with the deployment of valuable
inventions to the marketplace and increase the uncertainty surrounding the rights of potential
patents, which in turn may limit a company’s ability to license or engage in related activity (Frakes
and Wasserman, 2016). The Patent Office has repeatedly stated that its biggest challenge to
fulfilling its mission of providing high quality timely reviews is its existing backlog of applications
(Frakes and Wasserman 2015). Our estimates imply that the increases in processing delays
stemming from procrastination of first office actions may have contributed to as much as 17% of
the highly publicized growth rate in the Agency’s backlog of applications over our sample period.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part II, we review the existing literature on procrastination.
In Part III, we provide a background on the patent examination process and theorize the ways in
which non-procrastinating and procrastinating examiners approach the timing of their tasks. In
Part IV, we discuss the data and methodologies that we employ to test the predictions from Part II
and subsequently present the results of such tests. Finally, in Part V, we conclude.

3 Contributions

to this literature include Cockburn et al. 2003, Lemley and Sampat 2012, Frakes and Wasserman 2017a, and Frakes
and Wasserman 2016. For a recent survey of this literature, Frakes and Wasserman 2017b.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Evidence bearing directly on the existence and degree of procrastination remains rather limited.
More common are studies that have documented markers of time-inconsistent behavior and present
bias more broadly, even if not specifically focused on delays in the completion of assigned tasks
(of the sort that we commonly associate with the notion of procrastination). In this vein, scholars
have documented evidence consistent with present bias in a such settings as caloric intake by foodstamp recipients (Shapiro 2005), tobacco consumption (Gruber and Koszegi 2001), gym
membership (Acland and Levy 2015), life cycle savings (Laibson et al. 2007), food choice (Brown
et al. 2009) and movie choices (Read, Lowenstein, and Kalyanaraman 1999).
As suggested by the topics of emphasis in these studies, the literature on present-bias has
overwhelmingly focused on settings of a more personal nature. Rare are those studies focusing on
procrastination or present-bias in the workplace, where the productivity consequences of these
phenomena are potentially substantial. Insofar as the workplace generally incorporates external
forms of control—e.g., supervision—and carries potentially significant consequences for poor
performance—e.g., advancement, termination—there may be little reason to think the behavioral
results from the non-workplace settings will generalize to this critical environment. One recent
workplace investigation into self-control problems, however, is provided by Kaur, Kremer and
Mullainathan (2015), which presents the results of a field experiment on data entry workers in
India, finding evidence that when faced with the option of entering into a contract with piece-rate
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compensation versus a dominated contract that penalizes this compensation should workers fall
below a target, many workers select the dominated option (presumably as a self-control device).4
A second limitation with the existing literature is that most of the supporting evidence of
procrastination—and of time-inconsistent behaviors more generally—comes from the laboratory.5
A small but growing number of studies have moved beyond the laboratory into a more natural,
real-world setting by investigating these phenomena through field experiments.6 We are aware of
very few studies, if any, that have employed certain methodological techniques—including those
quasi-experimental in nature—within an observational framework to document evidence
suggestive of procrastination.7

Though the methodological challenges facing observational

approaches may be considerable, moving beyond a controlled experimental setting allows us to
expand the scope of contexts in which we may explore these behaviors, especially into a highskilled work environment where opportunities for experimental approaches may be more limited.
While an analysis of time-inconsistent behavior is interesting insofar as it challenges
assumptions of rationality, one’s primary interests arguably lie with the welfare implications of
any such irrationalities. A final limitation of the literature is that the impact of procrastination on
the quality of tasks performed is in need of greater study, having only been addressed in a limited
number of studies to date (Cadena et. al, 2011; Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan 2015).

Other recent examples can be found in Cadena et al.’s (2011) analysis of the effectiveness of reminders in reducing deadline
clustering in loan officers’ work efforts and Duflo, Kremer and Robinson’s (2011) analysis of the timing of fertilizer purchase
decisions and of the demand for pre-purchasing programs.
5 For an overview of such studies, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) and Sprenger (2015). A recent example
can be found in Bisin and Hyndman (2014), which experimentally documents a nearly 40% rate of present bias among college
students asked to perform various assignments—e.g., alphabetical sorting of word lists—within a week’s time.
6 Examples include Cadena et al. (2011), Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan (2015) and Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011).
7 One possible exception is found in Asch (1990), which estimated an increase in military recruiter productivity throughout a
roughly one-year monitoring period. Asch suggests that this pattern may be consistent with procrastination; however, she also
indicates that it may reflect a story in which recruiters work early in the observation period to stock-pile potential recruits and then
pull from this pile to varying degrees later on in strategic attempts to receive particular rewards.
4
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Our research on the Patent Office’s quota is also related to a strand of the personnel economics
literature addressing the impact of quota-based bonus schemes facing salespersons on the timing
of sales contracts (Oyer, 1998; Larkin 2014).8 This literature also predicts a spike in output at
deadlines, however, these spikes may arise from entirely different mechanisms. For instance, in a
sales contract context, end-of-period bunching of sales could result from salespersons trying to hit
quotas by using price manipulations to “pull in” some sales at the end of one period that would
have otherwise occurred in the beginning of the next period. In this sales example, lighter work
product earlier in the period need not arise solely from a model of time-inconsistent behavior and
worker delay, but could also result from lower-than-expected sales demand—i.e., from factors
outside of the workers’ control. This latter mechanism is arguably less relevant in the patent
context, given that the Agency’s substantial backlog of applications ensures that examiners always
have reviews at their disposal that they can undertake in an effort to hit their quota.
Balasubramanian et al. (2017) discuss a “pull-in” story similar to that of the sales quota context.
Interestingly, their analysis likewise focuses on the patent application process, though it explores
the behavior of applicants and their attorneys, as opposed to examiners. They find that application
filings by applicants tend to experience modest spikes on the last day of the month. Interviews
with applicant attorneys reveal that these spikes may be due to monthly deadlines facing attorneys
in many firms.9 The authors, however, note that they are unable to distinguish a procrastination
explanation for these spikes from a story in which applicant attorneys perhaps work longer than
expected on applications earlier in the month and then accelerate work effort at the end of the
month in order to meet the deadline (pulling applications that would have otherwise been filed
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For a related discussion, see Courty and Marshke 2004. For other research on the effects of deadlines, see Chetty et al. (2014).
The nature of these applicant-related deadlines and the extent to which they apply to all applications (as is the case with the
examiner deadlines we study) is unclear, however.
9
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later). Interviews with applicant attorneys suggest that attorneys are more likely following the
latter model. In our analysis of patent examiner behavior below, we attempt to separate an
acceleration story from a delay story by employing tests that target self-control mechanisms—e.g.,
through the tele-commuting quasi-experiment discussed below.
III. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
III.A. Description of Examination Process
Every patent application filed with the Patent Office contains a specification, which describes
the invention, and a set of claims that defines the metes and bounds of the legal rights the applicant
is seeking. Before an application enters examination, it is routed to an Art Unit, a group of eight
to fifteen patent examiners who review applications in the same technological field. Upon arrival,
the Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE) of that Art Unit randomly assigns the application to a
specific examiner (Lemley & Sampat, 2012).10 The examination will typically begin with the
examiner conducting a prior art search, that is a search of previous patents, patent applications, or
other publications, that are material to the patentability of the relevant invention. Upon completion
of such search, the examiner assesses the patentability of the invention based on the criteria
outlined in the Patent Act—e.g., whether the claimed invention is novel and nonobvious.
After assessing the patentability of the claims, an examiner composes a “first office action on
the merits” (FOAM), which is non-final in nature (if it constitutes a rejection), and either allows
the patent to issue or outlines the reasons for why the invention fails to meet the patentability
standards. An applicant responds to a FOAM rejection by amending the claims or disputing the
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Occasionally, SPEs make non-random assignments, but in those instances, they do so not based on any characteristic that would
affect the patentability of the application but instead, for instance, on an examiner’s backlog of applications We conducted a series
of telephone interviews with former SPEs to confirm these details of patent examination assignment.
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rejection. Upon receipt of the applicant’s response, the examiner will issue a second office action
that will either: (1) allow the patent to issue, (2) finally reject the application, or (3) non-finally
reject the application. If the examiner set forth all of the reasons for rejection in the FOAM and
believes the invention still fails to meet the patentability standards, she will finally reject the
application. If the examiner issued an incomplete FOAM—i.e., failed to include all bases for
rejecting the application in the FOAM—she will issue a second non-final rejection which includes
new grounds to reject the application.11 The Patent Office views second non-final office actions
as an indicator of low quality examination because an examiner who issues such an office action
is essentially conceding her initial review was inadequate. Whereas an applicant can respond to a
second non-final rejection by amending the claims or arguing the rejection is improper, an
applicant’s response is more circumscribed with respect to a final rejection. In the latter case, the
aggrieved applicant must abandon the application altogether, appeal the denied application to
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or continue the examination process by filing a repeat application.12
Although the stages associated with the patent examination procedure are relatively structured,
it is well recognized that patent examiners are afforded substantial discretion on how they approach
the process (Cockburn et al. 2003). As with any complex task associated with substantial
discretion, concerns regarding worker procrastination may arise. Allegations of procrastination
within the Patent Office have recently made headlines. However, even before these latest
controversies, the Agency was possibly aware of potential time-inconsistent behavior of examiners
given their choice to utilize a conventional method to minimize procrastination—quotas.
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An examiner may not render a final rejection that contains a new ground of rejection, unless the new ground is necessitated by
the applicant’s claim amendments, or, in certain cases, if the new ground is based on information submitted in the applicant’s
information disclosure statement. MPEP 706.07(A).
12 Repeat applications generally fall in one of two categories: continuation applications and Requests for Continued Examination
(RCE). While there are technical differences between the two, which in part account for the popularity of the latter over the former,
they are largely used for the same purpose: providing the applicant who has been denied the coverage she seeks with an additional
chance for her patent application to be allowed.
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III.B. Quotas
Examiners are expected to attain a certain number of work credits, often referred to as “counts,”
on a bi-weekly and quarterly period, where such expectations are a function of the complexity of
the field in which the examiner is working and on her position in the general schedule (GS) pay
scale.13 Credits, however, have historically been earned only upon the issuance of a FOAM and
at final disposal, which occurs when a patent application is either allowed by the examiner or
abandoned by the applicant (often after receipt of a final rejection or in anticipation of such a
rejection).14 Notably, no work credits are earned for the issuance of a second non-final rejection.
Supervisors monitor examiners progress towards meeting their quotas at both bi-weekly and
quarterly periods. In fact, examiners at pay grades GS-13 and below must have their decisions
reviewed by a supervisor before they are communicated with the applicant. Examiners who have
reached pay grade GS-13 with partial signatory authority have the ability to sign off on FOAM
independently whereas examiners at pay grades at GS-14 and above have the ability to sign off on
all of their work independently. In order to be promoted, an examiner typically need not only meet
her workload goals but surpass them. Failure to earn the target amount of work credits can
ultimately result in termination of employment (or in production bonus implications).
III.C. Hypotheses
III.C.1. Procrastination patterns

13

A patent examiner in a more complex field has a lower quota of work units. Moreover, the higher the pay grade of an examiner
within a technology area the greater her workload goals. Examiners must also meet workflow or docket management goals which
seek to ensure that the flow of patent applications through the examination process align with prescribed time periods set by the
Patent Office. These workflow goals are described in more detail in the Online Appendix. Because the workflow goals
overwhelmingly align with end of bi-week, we utilize the term bi-weekly quota in the Article to refer to both production and
workflow targets.
14 Since 2010 examiners can also earn partial credits for final office actions and examiner-initiated interviews with the patent
applicant or her attorney. Under either system, a patent examiner earns a maximum of two credits per patent application examined.
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Given the role of quotas in personnel outcomes at the Patent Office, we assume that examiners
will be incentivized to hit their production targets.15 The question facing us is how they space out
their work efforts over the observation period to reach this target. In the Online Appendix, we set
forth a model inspired by Fischer (2001), which predicts that a time-consistent examiner that is
motivated as such will reach her goals while roughly smoothing her work efforts evenly throughout
the observation period (a prediction that is intuitive in light of the assumed concavity in utility for
leisure). We extend this framework in the Online Appendix to introduce quasi-hyperbolic
discounting by examiners (Laibson 1997). The key implication of this time-inconsistent approach
is that examiners will tend to delay their initial intentions to begin working towards their bi-weekly
goal and cluster their work efforts near the deadline.16 In the first exercise of our empirical analysis
below, we begin to test for the presence of procrastination by assessing whether examiners indeed
bunch their work product around the end of the bi-weekly (and quarterly) quotas.
III.C.2. Consequences of procrastination
We offer two competing theories for the manner in which examiner procrastination may
compromise the quality of application review. Each theory starts with an assumption that
procrastinating examiners will face time constraints in completing the large number of tasks that
they have left for themselves at the end of the quota period. First, examiners who are scrambling
to meet their workload goals may grant patents excessively. That is, because patent applications
are presumed valid—and thus no justification for an acceptance is required—an examiner who
does not have sufficient time to conduct her search of the prior art and analyze the patentability of
the claims may grant an invalid patent that she may not have otherwise granted.

15
16

This assumption is supported by our interviews with examiners and former Supervisory Patent Examiners.
This implication holds whether examiners are treated as naive or sophisticated hyperbolic discounters.
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Alternatively, an examiner who has procrastinated may choose to meet her quota by issuing low
quality or “shotgun” rejections at the end of a bi-week or quarter, which may likewise take less
time to process than an otherwise unaffected review. A “shotgun” rejection is an invalid rejection
that fails to meet the legal requirements—e.g., rejecting an invention as non-novel even though
the cited prior art does not disclose the invention.17 Notably, examiners may opt for this approach
over the summary-acceptance approach when completing a FOAM given that examiners afford
themselves a second chance in such instances to more thoroughly review the application in
subsequent round(s). Simply accepting the application outright affords them no such opportunity.
IV. ANALYSIS
IV.A. Preliminary Analysis: End-loading of Applications
IV.A.1. Methodology and Data
Observationally documenting procrastination in the workplace is an exercise that confronts a
number of methodological challenges. First necessary for such purposes are data on the work
product of employees over sufficiently fine-grained intervals of time—e.g., daily data on employee
output, where this output is amenable to quantification in the first place. Information of this nature
allows one to depict a time path of employee behavior. To meet this need, we collected data from
the Patent Office’s Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) database on nearly 2 million
utility patent applications that were filed between March, 2001 and July 2012. The PAIR database
provides information on a number of characteristics of, and events associated with, each
application. Critical for our purposes is the PAIR’s Transaction History File, which, among many
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A shotgun rejection is a term of art in the field of patent law. The term refers to patent examiners rejecting claims for
“questionable reasons” in part “because of time pressures of work at the [Agency]” (Pressman and Stim 2015). In addition to
providing broad-based empirical support regarding the existence of “shotgun rejections,” our analysis also contributes to the field’s
understanding of this term of art by theorizing a more nuanced mechanism behind the time-pressured explanation for this behavior.
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other things, provides information on the timing of completion—to the day—of the FOAM, along
with information on the disposition of that FOAM—i.e., rejection or allowance.
Daily recordings of the completion of worker tasks alone, however, will generally not suffice to
inform on the likelihood of procrastinating tendencies. Of critical import to a procrastination
analysis is some benchmark signifying the time path that a non-procrastinating worker would
follow in approaching her tasks. Naturally, establishing this benchmark requires some expectation
as to how long the relevant task should take to complete given no delays in work effort. For
instance, if one observes a journalist taking 14 days to write a story, it is difficult with this
information alone to know whether the journalist worked diligently throughout that 14-day period
or whether she did nothing for the first 13 days. Unlike this journalism hypothetical, our analysis
of the patent context benefits from the fact that the Patent Office sets expectations—and enforces
such expectations—as to how much work product examiners must complete over a 14-day period
and thus how much time on average examiners must work on their reviews. While an enforced
quota system is thus helpful in establishing this benchmark, one may be concerned that it removes
the scope for procrastination in the first place. However, the fact that the Patent Office does not
enforce expectations daily, but only over bi-weeks, leaves open the possibility that examiners will
delay their work efforts within this evaluation period. The model that we present in the Online
Appendix suggests that a non-procrastinating examiner would tend to smooth her work efforts
within this bi-week period, whereas a procrastinating examiner would bunch her work efforts near
the end of the period. Accordingly, the methodological thrust of this initial exercise is to assess
whether examiners indeed bunch—i.e., end-load—their examination reviews in this manner.
IV.A.2. End-loading Results
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Figure I presents a histogram of the completion of FOAM, broken down into daily frequency
bins.18 For initial illustrative purposes, we have chosen to do this over a representative year—
2010. The daily frequency distribution depicted in Figure I demonstrates a striking degree of
bunching in the completion of FOAM at the end of quota periods. Specifically, this figure
evidences 26 evenly spaced spikes in the frequency by which FOAM are completed, coinciding
with the end of each bi-week period. Examiner reviews are lightest at the beginning of each biweek period. As the bi-weekly quota period nears its end, workload counts gradually begin to
increase, with a spike on the last day of the bi-week period, a progression in daily productivity
counts that is consistent with delayed onset of work efforts.19
In Figure II, we present a more generalized histogram that depicts FOAM counts by day, but
where the relevant time period signifies days prior to a bi-weekly quota period event. Accordingly,
this figure presents FOAM counts for 14 days, effectively averaging FOAM counts for all calendar
dates that fell 13 days prior to a bi-weekly deadline, all calendar dates that fell 12 days prior to a
bi-weekly deadline and so on and so forth. In this process, we include data from the full 20022012 sample. Figure II paints essentially the same picture as that shown in our representative year,
2010, from Figure I (note that the dips in activity represent weekends; the final day of the biweekly period generally falls on a Monday).
As stated previously, in addition to bi-weekly monitoring, examiners are expected to hit
quarterly targets, effectively allowing them to catch up on any missed bi-weekly targets. As
demonstrated by Figure I, we also observe a second degree of FOAM bunching that appears right
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Importantly, by FOAM, we refer to the first office action associated with a given application. Technically, the first office action
after the filing of a Request for Continuing Examination (RCE) may be viewed as a FOAM. Since that action would be continuing
the same application, however, we view it as different from the actual initial office action.
19 The OIG reports (2014, 2015) previously mentioned do not depict histograms of this nature. Rather, they simply indicate that
specified percentages of examiners submit specified percentages of their applications at the end of the quarter. As such, the OIG
reports also overlook the bi-week aspect of workload expectations.
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at quarter ends. Moreover, we observe a progression of increased intensity of bi-week spikes as
we approach the end of the quarter—a progression that mirrors the daily patterns we observe within
each bi-week. These patterns collectively suggest that examiners may delay in the onset of their
biweekly targets in addition to delaying in the catch-up process they are afforded on a quarterly
basis. Moreover, the magnitude of this end-of-period bunching is substantial. Nearly half of all
FOAM completed in the dataset took place on the last day of a quota period (Table I).
IV.B. From End-loading to Procrastination: Overview of Next Steps
While end-loading of applications is consistent with the predictions of a model of examiner
behavior characterized by time inconsistent preferences—and thus suggestive of procrastination—
end-loading itself could conceivably be explained by a range of alternative time-consistent theories
of behavior in which examiners work diligently and consistently throughout the sample period.
For instance, among other theories we will consider, we may observe end-loading of FOAM
reviews because patent examiners systematically work more hours on each application than
expected by the Patent Office, causing them to rush at the end of the period on those that they did
not leave themselves time for. The remainder of this paper attempts to set forth an additional span
of empirical findings that collectively support a procrastination interpretation of examiner behavior
and that mediate against various alternative time-consistent theories of behavior. To this end, we
proceed by assuming that examiners do indeed procrastinate on their examination tasks and then
predicting a range of additional behavioral outcomes—beyond the mere end-loading of
applications depicted in Figure I—that one would expect to observe in the face of such
procrastination. We then use our application level data and employ various methodological
techniques to test each such prediction. In sub-section E, we then return to a discussion of a range
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of alternative time-consistent theories and address the ways in which the various findings favor a
procrastination interpretation of the observed behaviors over these alternative theories.
IV.C. End-loading across Stages of Examination Process
Again, Figure I focuses on the first substantive review that patent examiners undertake. Given
that only 11% of applications are allowed on the FOAM, the typical application involves multiple
stages of review. To the extent that there are fixed costs associated with reviewing a file—e.g., an
investment of time into understanding the basics of the claimed invention—one might predict that
the burden of the examination process to the examiner diminishes across office actions. That is,
the examiner may view the FOAM—where these fixed costs will be concentrated—as more
unpleasant than the second and third office actions (should matters proceed that far). O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2008) model a task process that involves multiple stages, much like the patent
examination process (along with a model characterized by hyperbolic discounting). They suggest
that one would predict more procrastination in the earlier stage of the work process if more of the
fixed costs associated with the task are concentrated on that earlier stage.
These considerations might suggest more procrastination at the FOAM stage relative to later
office actions. That is, we predict that examiners would tend to space their efforts on later office
actions more evenly throughout the bi-week observation period. We assess this prediction in
Figures A2 and A3 of the Online Appendix, replicating the histogram presented in Figure I but
focusing on the second and third office actions, respectively (conditional on those applications that
reach those stages of review). We continue to demonstrate substantial end-loading at the secondoffice-action stage, though nonetheless to a weaker extent relative to the first round of review.
While nearly 50% of the FOAMs are completed at the quota end, 35% of the second office actions
are completed at those times. Moreover, we find that the second dimension of end-loading—that
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is, clustering of reviews at the end of quarters—appears to have diminished considerably by the
second stage of the review process. By the time applications proceed to the third stage of review
(which is generally the first office action following the filing of a Request for Continued
Examination), examiners tend to end-load their work efforts to a substantially weaker extent—
only 11 percent of the time (note—lack of true end-loading would nonetheless entail 10 percent of
reviews falling on the last day). Ultimately, this declining severity of end-loading by office action
is consistent with the predictions just set forth and thus provides further evidence supportive of a
procrastination interpretation for the end-loading of applications observed in Figure I.
IV.D. Evaluating the Consequences of End-loading / Procrastination
IV.D.1. Methodology
If examiners do procrastinate in their examination practices—continuing to assume that
examiners are nonetheless motivated to hit their quota—one would predict that examiners would
be forced to rush their remaining reviews at the end of the quota period. In Section II, we theorized
various ways in which this end-of-period rushing may impact the quality of the examination
process. In this sub-section, we test for markers of these theorized quality outcomes. To the extent
that our evaluations of the outcomes of the examination process coincide with the predicted
outcomes of a procrastination-induced end-of-period rush, the analysis may further lend support
to a procrastination interpretation of the previously documented end-loading of applications.
Beyond helping to mediate between time-consistent and time-inconsistent explanations for our
findings, this analysis also offers novel insights generally regarding the consequences of workplace
procrastination and specifically regarding the consequences to patent policy of examination delays.
To recap, we predict that procrastination-induced rushes at the end of the period may leave
examiners inclined to issue quickly produced and ill-conceived “shotgun” rejections, leaving
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themselves the option to correct this inadequate review in subsequent rounds of review. To explore
this possibility, we estimate the following specification out of the sample of first office actions:
𝐹𝑂𝐴𝑀_𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛄𝐢 + 𝛌𝐭 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛃2 𝐗 𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖𝑡

(1)

where a indexes the individual application, i indexes the individual examiner, t indexes the year in
which the first office action on the merits (FOAM) is completed by the examiner. FOAM_Allowait
indicates whether or not the application was allowed on the given FOAM. Endloadedait indicates
whether or not the FOAM was completed on the last day of the quota period. Year fixed effects
(based on the timing of the FOAM) are captured by 𝛌𝐭 and examiner fixed effects are captured by
𝛄𝐢 . With the latter inclusion, we effectively estimate whether given examiners allow applications
on the FOAM at lower rates when those applications fall during the end-of-period time crunch
relative to when they review applications during the middle of the quota period. Examiner fixed
effects help alleviate concerns that examiners with high propensities to end-load fundamentally
differ in their practices—e.g., in their allowance propensities—relative to examiners with smaller
propensities to end-load. We also control for a number of other characteristics of applications,
Xait, several of which the literature has demonstrated are important determinants of the granting
practices of examiners (Frakes & Wasserman, 2017a): dummy variables for (1) the examiner’s
General-Schedule pay level, (2) examiner experience levels (in 2-year bins), (3) technology groups
(using the 37 National Bureau of Economic Research technology sub-categories, (4) the incidence
of a large entity applicant and (5) the incidence of foreign priority for the given application
(previous filing at the JPO or EPO).20 In sub-section F(3) below, we consider an instrumental
variables modification to this specification to account for other unobservables.
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Standard errors are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time.
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IV.D.2. Results
We present the results of this exercise in Table II. These findings are consistent with the
“shotgun” rejection theory whereby examiners become less likely to allow on the FOAM when
they are reviewing a large cluster of applications during the end of the quota period. On average,
a given examiner will allow on the FOAM at a roughly 10 percentage-point lower rate—or a nearly
87 percent lower rate—when that same examiner reviews an application on the last day of a quota
period relative to the prior days within the quota period. The magnitude of this relationship is
staggering, reflecting a potentially substantial behavioral response to the end-of-period rush.
One might predict that any effect of end-of-period time crunches on the FOAM decision for an
individual application will be especially strong in the case of those examiners facing substantial
end-of-period demands on their full workload—i.e., those examiners most prone to end-loading
practices. To test this prediction, we modify equation to include an interaction between the FOAM
end-loading indicator for the given application and a variable capturing the relevant examiner’s
overall end-loading rate (calculated leaving out the given application). We present the results from
this specification in Table II. Through the estimated coefficient of the interaction term, we test the
prediction that the negative relationship between end-loading and FOAM allowances will only be
stronger in the face of examiners with high mean end-loading rates—i.e., we predict a negative
estimate of the coefficient of the interaction term. As demonstrated by Table II, we find evidence
consistent with this prediction, providing greater confidence that the observation of substantially
lower FOAM allowance rates for applications reviewed at quota ends derives from the
hypothesized mechanism—i.e., an end-of-period time crunch.
To further evaluate whether this substantial elevation in end-of-quota rejections are indeed quick
“shotgun” rejections whereby examiners buy time to conduct a more thorough review later, we
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proceed to evaluate the nature of the examination process in subsequent periods. To begin, we
turn to the decisions made in the second round of review. Particularly, we look for markers
indicative of the type of inadequate review in the first round that one might expect if examiners
did indeed issue shotgun rejections in response to procrastination-induced time crunches. As noted
above, the Patent Office views second non-final rejections as an indicator of low quality review
because an examiner that issues such an office action is essentially conceding that her initial review
of the application was incomplete. As demonstrated by Table III, we find that an application that
was rejected in an end-loaded FOAM is around 1.4-2 percentage points—or roughly 8-12%—
more likely to receive a second non-final office action rejection relative to an application whose
initial rejection occurred during the within-quota period. This result is consistent with a theory
that examiners are issuing low quality rejections at the end of quota period.
We next examine the likelihood that an application that is rejected on an end-loaded FOAM will
ultimately be allowed throughout the course of the entire examination process. To the extent that
procrastinating examiners are conducting more substantive reviews in later rounds one might
predict that the ultimate allowance rates of an application with an end-loaded FOAM would
approach that of an application whose FOAM was not end-loaded. Though end-loading appears
to be associated with a substantially lower rate of allowance on the FOAM, there indeed appears
to be a much weaker relationship between end-loading of applications and the ultimate likelihood
that the application is allowed upon final disposition. We demonstrate such findings in Columns
4-6 of Table III, estimating specifications identical to (1) above but replacing the FOAM allowance
incidence as the dependent variable with the incidence of the application ultimately being allowed
(out of the sample of applications disposed of during the sample period). Applications whose
FOAM were reviewed during an end-loaded period are roughly 1.8 percentages points—or roughly
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2.5 percent—less likely to be allowed than those whose FOAM were reviewed during the withinquota period. These differences are far less than the gaps in allowance patterns present on the
FOAM themselves (presented above).
This pattern of results is consistent with the theory that end-of-quota-period time constraints
may induce examiners on the FOAM to submit weak and easily overcome rejections, affording
themselves the ability to do a proper review on later iterations of the review period and thus the
ability to exercise roughly the same degree of application scrutiny they otherwise would if they
had not procrastinated in the first place (below, we offer an explanation for the small negative
relationship that we nonetheless do find between end-loading and ultimate allowance).
In another attempt to assess the scrutiny of review applied to applications initially end-loaded,
we look beyond the mere allowance or not of the application. Instead, we consider a metric
indicative of the legal validity of any issued patent resulting from that application. For these
purposes, we exploit the fact that many U.S. applicants likewise file for patent protection in
European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO), two foreign offices that have
roughly similar patentability requirements but invest substantially more in the examination process
per application relative to the U.S. Patent Office. Accordingly, we consider the sample of issued
patents in which the relevant U.S. applicant likewise sought protection at the EPO and JPO and
use outcomes at these foreign offices as a benchmark—although an imperfect one—to assess the
underlying validity of those patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office (Frakes and Wasserman,
2017a; Lemley and Sampat, 2012). If the ultimate review of applications whose FOAM were endloaded were of the same degree of quality relative to those that were not end-loaded, we would
expect the likelihood a U.S. issued patent was allowed at both the EPO and JPO would not depend
upon whether the FOAM was end-loaded in the U.S. We present results from this exercise in
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Columns 7-9 of Table III, finding a 0.6 percentage-point reduction—or roughly a 1.3 percent
reduction—in the likelihood of a U.S.-issued patent being allowed at both the EPO and the JPO
when that U.S.-issued patent was end-loaded on its FOAM. This suggests that those applications
subjected to an end-of-quota rush may be of slightly weaker quality / legal validity relative to those
applications not subjected to such rushes. Though end-loading may be associated with some
quality deterioration, the magnitude of this difference is not substantial, consistent with the abovestated suggestion that the initially vast gap in the scrutiny of review between end-loaded and nonend-loaded FOAM narrows as examiners proceed to later stages of the review process.
Though procrastination does not appear to lead to substantial impacts on the way in which legal
patentability standards are ultimately applied to an application, this behavioral phenomenon may
nonetheless prolong the review process, an outcome with undesirable effects of its own. Put
simply, if procrastination-induced time pressures are causing examiners to produce “shotgun”
rejections on the FOAM, the result may be a completely wasted first-round of review.
Understanding the extent to which examiner procrastination is contributing to application
processing delays is of critical import to the Agency, given that the Patent Office has repeatedly
stated that its growing backlog of applications is its biggest challenge.
To explore this mater, we estimate specifications that examine the relationship between the endloading of a FOAM and various metrics indicative of the length of the review process: (1) the
incidence of a Request for Continued Examination filed in connection with the application, a
device that allows rejected applicants to continue their applications even after receiving a final
rejection, (2) the number of Requests for Continued Examinations filed, and (3) the duration in
days of the examination period. In each case, we find evidence suggesting that end-loading on the
FOAM is associated with a prolonging of the examination review process (see Table IV). On
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average, an application that is reviewed at the end of the quota period relative to the within-quota
period is roughly 2.4 percentage points more likely—or nearly 10 percent more likely—to have an
RCE filed. We also find that end-loading of the FOAM is associated with a 12 percent increase in
the number of RCEs filed for the application in question. Finally, end-loading on the FOAM is
associated with an average increase of 50 days in the examination period.21 In Section IV below,
we calibrate the magnitude of these findings to suggest the degree to which examiner
procrastination is contributing to the annual growth rate in the Agency’s backlog.
IV.E. Telecommuting Analysis
The Patent Office has recently made a substantial push towards allowing patent examiners to
work from home. We predict that examiner self-control problems will intensify upon entering a
work environment where monitoring and supervision is decreased. To the extent it supports a selfcontrol story in general, a finding that end-loading (and other markers of procrastination) increases
upon the commencement of teleworking will further bolster the suggestion that the end-of-period
clustering of FOAMs depicted in Figure I is itself the result of self-control limitations.
The Patent Office began rolling out its teleworking program in the mid-2000s. While the
Agency offers a variety of telework options for its employees, the largest of these programs is the
Patents Hoteling Program (PHP). To be eligible for the PHP, patent examiners must have achieved
a GS-12 level, have positive performance ratings, and have worked at the Agency for at least two
years. Participating patent examiners work from home at least 4 days a week and relinquish their
office space at the Agency’s headquarters. The PHP began in 2006 with 500 examiners and has
been popular. By 2011 the program expanded to include over 2,600 examiners. The election into
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These duration findings perhaps explain the small, negative relationship that we do observe between the end-loading of a first
office action and the ultimate allowance of that application. The longer the duration of the examination, the more likely it is that
an applicant will abandon her application. Since abandonments are considered an application disposition, this possibility may be
contributing to the observation of a slightly lower overall grant rate for end-loaded versus non-end-loaded applications.
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the hoteling program does not affect an examiner’s quota. For each examiner in our dataset, we
obtained information—via the filing of Freedom of Information Act Requests—on whether or not
they participated in the PHP and what day, month and year they started working from home.
To test the above prediction, we estimate the following examiner fixed-effects specification:
4

𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛄𝐢 + 𝛌𝐭 + 𝛃1 ∑ 𝐓𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝑖𝑟 + 𝛃2 𝐗 𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑎𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝑟=−4

where a indexes the individual application, i indexes the individual examiner, t indexes the year
in which the first office action is completed by the examiner, and where Endloadingait , 𝛌𝐭 , 𝛄𝐢 . Xait,
are as above. We include a series of event-time dummy variables (∑4𝑟=−4 𝐓𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝑖𝑟 )
indicating the periods of time leading up to and following a given examiner’s onset of
telecommuting—that is, a dummy variable indicating that an application’s first office action was
performed in the 4th year prior to the onset of telecommuting, the 3rd year prior to the onset of
telecommuting, and so on and so forth. This specification essentially embraces a dynamic
difference-in-difference framework, in which we look at changes in end-loading practices before
and after an examiner’s commencement of telecommuting, using those examiners not switching
their teleworking status over those time periods as a control group. The dynamic aspect of this
specification allows us to explore whether any such change in end-loading tendencies precipitated
the start of the telecommuting program—which would undermine a causal interpretation of the
findings—and whether any response in behavior to telecommuting evolved over time.
We plot the coefficients of the series of event-time indicators for the telecommuting variable in
Figure III (in Table A1 of the Online Appendix, we show the corresponding regression table). As
this figure demonstrates, in the period of time leading up to the commencement of telecommuting,
the telecommuting and non-telecommuting examiners trended in the same direction. Immediately
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upon joining the telework program, however, an examiner’s incidence of end-loading—of
completing a given application’s first office action on the last day of the quota period—increases
by 7 percentage points, or by nearly 14%.22 In Table A3 of the Online Appendix, we demonstrate
the year-by-year stability in the incidence of two immutable application characteristics—applicant
entity size and foreign priority status—as examiners approach and surpass the onset of
telecommuting. This falsification exercise lends confidence to our telecommuting research design
in suggesting no case mix sensitivity to an examiner’s telecommuting experiences.
Further supporting the notion that this reduced supervision intensifies examiners’ procrastinating
tendencies, the evidence also suggests that the degree to which examiners issue “shotgun”
rejections at the end of the quota increases following the onset of telecommuting. Previously, we
flagged the presence of shotgun rejections by looking within given examiners and comparing first
office action allowance rates for those applications that they review at the end of the quota period
relative to those that they review during the interim quota period. In Table V, we extend this
shotgun-rejection exercise by tracking how such comparisons evolve in the years leading up to
and subsequent to the onset of telecommuting, which we accomplish by estimating examiner fixed
effects specifications that include each of the event time indicators, an indicator variable for the
application falling at the quota end, and the interaction between the event time indicators and the
end-of-period indicator. The estimated coefficients of these interaction terms suggest that the
FOAM-allowance differential between the end of period and the interim period intensifies
following telecommuting—that is, even more rejecting on the FOAM for end-loaded relative to
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We note that this pattern of coefficients looks nearly identical when taking a more balanced approach that only follows examiners
that we can follow for at least 4 years before and after telecommuting.
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non-end-loaded applications—despite the fact that the corresponding differential in the odds that
the application is ultimately allowed does not substantially change over this time.23
All told, these findings suggest that the pattern of results presented in the above sections only
strengthens when examiners face less direct supervision. This finding reinforces a procrastination
interpretation of the above patterns in light of the expected effect that the weakened supervisions
associated with telecommuting would tend to have on pre-existing self-control problems.
While the shock to the examiners’ end-loading practices upon the onset of telecommuting seems
clear from the findings, there is some uncertainty in the data regarding how long-lived this effect
is. First, we observe that the difference in end-loading rates between the treated and control
examiners returns to its pre-telecommuting levels after several years, suggesting that examiners
may learn some degree of discipline in working from home over time. Interestingly, though, the
rate by which end-loaded applications are rejected on the FOAM relative to non-end-loaded
applications continues to remain high—perhaps even increases further—several years following
telecommuting. As such, telecommuting may actually lead to a more permanent shift in the
tendency to rush work efforts at the end of the quota period.
We acknowledge the possibility that worker preferences themselves may change upon shifting
to a home-working environment. When facing requirements to spend a set number of hours per
day at a centralized office, workers’ opportunities for leisure on those days are arguably limited—
e.g., web-surfing, reading, gossiping with co-workers, etc. In such environments, the assumption
of diminishing returns to leisure made in the above model is perhaps reasonable. With diminished
supervision and the ability to work out of a home environment, workers acquire the ability to enjoy
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The downward trend in the sequence of interaction coefficients arguably begins prior to the onset of telecommuting; however,
the negative trend in the FOAM allowance differential between end-loaded and non-end-loaded applications intensifies following
the beginning of telecommuting, consistent with a causal response.
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new forms of leisure during the work week, including acts of leisure that may require an investment
of a critical block of time—e.g., amusement parks, skiing, etc. With this new possibility set,
workers may begin to exhibit some degree of convexity in preferences for leisure and therefore
desire to cluster work efforts on certain days in order to free up a sufficient degree of time on other
days. Accordingly, from a time-consistent framework, one might predict some degree of increased
clustering in work effort following telecommuting. Under this alternative framework, however,
there would be no reason to predict that this new clustering would always occur on the last day of
the Patent Office’s quota period.

The fact that deadline spikes only intensify following

telecommuting favors the procrastination story over this convex-preferences alternative.
IV.F. Assessing Alternative Time-Consistent Explanations
Collectively, the above findings are consistent with the various predictions we have made about
patent examiner behavior under a theory of procrastination. With this final analysis, we consider
the possibility that these collective findings may also be consistent with a range of time-consistent
models of examiner behavior. Each of the alternatives considered are arguably consistent with the
mere fact that we observe clustering of applications at the end of quota periods. We assess,
however, whether these alternative theories are consistent with the remaining empirical
observations that we have made in our efforts to test the predictions of the procrastination model.
IV.F.1. Paper Pile Alternative
End-of-quota clustering in FOAM reviews could be consistent with a story in which examiners
work diligently throughout the observation period but simply accumulate their work product until
the point at which they turn in all of their reports at one time. Much of the additional findings,
however, are inconsistent with any such story. As an initial matter, we note that this explanation
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is incomplete in light of the fact that nearly half of all reviews continue to be processed in the
within-quota period. Second, consider our observation of even more intense spikes on quarterends. If examiners worked consistently over time and simply filed all of their reports at once,
they would do so and process all reports at every moment in which they were obligated to do so—
i.e., every two weeks—leaving no room for an independent quarter effect. Finally, there would be
no reason under this alternative story to expect that (1) end-loading would intensify upon the onset
of telecommuting, (2) that end-loaded applications would tend to exhibit markers suggestive of
shotgun rejections, or (3) that end-loading would weaken with successive office actions.
IV.F.2. Supervisor Effect
One may also be concerned that the end-of-period spikes shown in Figure I are solely the result
of delays in the supervisory approval process. That is, junior examiners may be working diligently
throughout the observation period but their supervisors are only approving their work in bunches
at the end of the quota period. As an initial matter, we note that this supervisor-delay alternative
does not entail a rush in the examiner’s work effort at the end of the period. As such, under this
alternative view, one would not expect to observe that end-loaded applications exhibit markers
indicative of shotgun rejections. The presence of such markers arguably favors the procrastination
explanation. In any event, to more completely assess this concern, we separately estimate the
degree of end-loading for examiners with and without the authority the sign off on their own
FOAM. As demonstrated by Table A2 in the Online Appendix, even those examiners with
independent authority of this nature exhibit a substantial degree of end-of-period bunching of
application reviews, doing so nearly 44% of the time (compared with 49% for the entire sample),
suggesting that the patterns from Figure I cannot be solely explained by a supervisor effect.
IV.F.3. Application Sorting
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One may have concerns that the end-of-period bunching demonstrated in Figure I is exclusively
the result of examiners sorting applications in various ways—for instance, examiners working on
more complex and thus more time-consuming applications during the beginning of the bi-week,
and then turning to the less time-intensive applications near the end.
To begin, we note that the observed increase in end-loading upon the onset of telecommuting
arguably favors the procrastination story. The Patent Office’s telecommuting program would
neither be expected to increase the share of easy cases that are docketed to an examiner, nor
increase the fundamental desire to sort based on complexity. Furthermore, the unique institutional
nature of the patent examination process also mediates against this concern. The completion of
the examination itself is tied to the tolling of a specified period of time—if the examiner is unable
to find and articulate a basis for rejection in that specified time, they are expected to allow the
application. As such, in the case of a difficult application that entails a cumbersome search into
its novelty and non-obviousness, the assigned examiner is expected to end the relevant search after
the designated time. This expectation might tend to cut against the possibility that the light FOAM
counts early in the bi-weeks reflects examiners focusing on especially complex applications and
spending more time on those applications than expected. Nonetheless, these expectations are only
enforced on average via the bi-week quota mechanisms, in which case we acknowledge that
examiners may nonetheless deviate from a per-application time expectancy. It bears emphasizing,
however, that for any such sorting to produce the degree of end-loading that we observe, there
would need to be an arguably unusual distribution of application complexities—a distribution in
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which nearly half of all applications are easy enough to address over a day’s time, whereas the
remaining half are complex enough to be spread over the remaining nine working days.24
It would also be unusual for this sorting story to produce the various markers of shotgun
rejections that we have observed. That is, under this sorting alternative, the cluster of examinations
at the end of the quota period would represent easier, less time-consuming cases. It is unclear why
those easily reviewed applications would be characterized by substantially higher rates of rejection
on the first office action followed by a leveling out of allowance rates in subsequent rounds of
review. If the end-loaded applications were inherently easier (either easy rejections or easy
allowances), one might expect that whatever allowance differential we observe on the FOAM
would persist when viewing allowance rates on the application as a whole.
In any event, let us assume that there is indeed an unobservable feature of application—e.g.,
complexity—on which examiners are sorting and that might explain the pattern of results presented
in Tables II and III. In a final empirical exercise, we attempt to account for any such unobservables
by modifying the examiner fixed-effects specification from equation (1) to instrument the endloading indicator variable for the given application with the examiner’s overall end-loading rate
for the given year (leaving out the influence of the given application on the end-loading rate
calculation). To the extent the mean end-loading rate reflects an examiner’s time-varying endloading “style,” one might expect that this style metric would correlate highly with the likelihood
that an individual application is end-loaded. Moreover, in light of the fact that applications are
randomly assigned to examiners, one would not expect that an examiner’s mean end-loading rate
to be associated with the unobserved complexity of the application at hand. As demonstrated by
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Moreover, very long patent applications also often contain multiple inventions in which an examiner can issue a restriction
requirement before substantive evaluation which in essence forces the patent applicant to break the application down into multiple
applications for review.
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Table VI, when taking this instrumental variables approach, the estimated relationship between an
end-loaded application and each of the following metrics indicative of the shotgun-rejection story
is very similar to the estimates previously presented in Tables II and III: the incidence of allowance
on the FOAM, the likelihood of a second office action non-final rejection, the likelihood of
ultimate allowance of the application, the duration in days of the examination process.
Finally, we note that there are no meaningful differences between end-loaded applications and
non-end-loaded applications in the two immutable application characteristics that we have in our
data—i.e., the incidence of a “large-entity” applicant and the incidence of a prior application at
either the European Office or the Japan Patent Office—as demonstrated by Table IV.
IV.F.4. Examiner Systematically Spending More Time Than Expected on Each Application
We consider the possibility that examiners will systematically deviate from the Patent Office’s
expectations by spending more time on each application than they are explicitly instructed to. If
examiners begin each quota period in this manner, they will naturally leave themselves an
insufficient amount of time at the end of the quota period to satisfy their internal desire to spend
an above-expected amount of time on each application. In this scenario, it is possible that
examiners may likewise decide to issue a shotgun rejection at the end of the quota period in order
to buy themselves enough time during a subsequent round of review to put in the desired amount
of effort. As such, this alternative explanation could account for the observation of both end-ofperiod bunching of FOAM reviews and the various markers of shotgun rejections. To be clear,
should this alternative mechanism in fact account for the observed results, examiners would likely
be spending double the amount of time on applications than instructed. Regardless of whether this
hypothesized expenditure of time is plausible, we do note that this alternative story is not consistent
with one important component to our empirical analysis—the telecommuting results.
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IV.F.5. Clustered Work Styles
Lastly, it might be that when examiners are more confident of their analysis—i.e., the application
appears to be a clear allowance or a clear rejection—they file the FOAM during the interim period
but when the patentability of an application is less clear they hold onto the FOAM in hopes that
they will be able to revisit the application before the bi-week is completed. In such a scenario, the
end-of-period bunching we observe in Figure I could be the result of examiners preserving the
option to reconsider a set of close call applications if time allows. This explanation seems
incomplete as examiners would have to be on average holding approximately fifty percent of all
FOAM in the hopes of returning to the applications later in the quota period. It seems unlikely
that examiners would reserve the option to revisit that many applications considering that they
would not have time to act on many of those options. Moreover, this alternative exaplanation is
likewise one that does not predict a change in endloading upon telecommuting.
V. CONCLUSION
The practice of end-loading by patent examiners—or waiting until deadlines to submit required
reviews—has been the subject of much recent conversation within the patent sphere and has even
been the topic of evaluation in recent reports by the Commerce Department’s Office of Inspector
General (OIG 2014, 2015). In this paper, we have attempted to document the full extent of this
practice and to investigate its origins. Does endloading arise from examiners procrastinating on
their assigned tasks or from some time-consistent pattern of behavior? The OIG reports suspect
that it is the former, but offers no analysis to help separate these possibilities Hypothesizing that
examiners indeed procrastinate on their work tasks, we theorize various ways in which this
behavior may impact their work product (beyond mere endloading itself). We also theorize that
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examiner procrastination will increase following a shift towarads examiner telecommuting. We
find evidence consistent with each such prediction, supporting the procrastination hypothesis.
To be sure, we can not say with confidence that the entirety of the observed end-of-period
bunching is a result of procrastination. It is possible that at least some of the spikes at the end of
the quota are a result of a combination of the various time-cosistent alternative hypotheses that we
explore. At the same time, however, the results suggest that the entirety of the observed endloading cannot be accounted for by these alternative stories. Collectively, the results suggest that
procrastination may be playing a strong role in shaping examiner behavior. If one nonetheless
assumes that the full extent of the observed end-loading reflects procrastination behavior, equation
(4) of the Online Appendix implies a present bias parameter of nearly 50%. This is comparable to
the 30-40% present bias estimated in Bisin and Hyndman (2014) in their experimental analysis of
procrastination among college students in performing designated tasks and to the 10-50% present
bias estimated in a range of additional studies surveyed by DellaVigna (2009).
Our analysis further suggests that the most notable consequence of procrastination to the quality
of the examination process is additional delay in the review process. Essentially, an inadequate
review completed in a rushed state at the end of a quota period is a lost opportunity that must be
made up for on subsequent rounds of review. Examination review delays may interfere with the
deployment of valuable inventions to the marketplace and increase the uncertainty surrounding the
rights of potential patents, which in turn may limit a company’s ability to license or engage in
related activity (Frakes and Wasserman, 2016). Delays may also lead firms to increasingly rely
on other methods of appropriation such as trade secrets, thus preventing public disclosure of
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information that future inventors may build upon.25 The literature has yet to exhaustively quantify
the extent of any of these social welfare harms. Nonetheless, those harms may be extensive enough
to have spurred the Patent Office into paying particular attention to its backlog. In fact, the Agency
has repeatedly stated that its biggest challenge to fulfilling its mission of providing high quality
timely review of applications is its existing backlog of applications (Frakes and Wasserman 2015).
Given that roughly half of all first office actions are end-loaded and that the Agency presently
reviews approximately 500,000 applications a year, we estimate that examiner procrastination in
just the first office action—let alone procrastination in subsequent rounds of review—is attributing
to over 12 million additional processing days a year. Through a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation applied to this amount, our analysis implies that the increases in processing delays
stemming from procrastination of first office actions may have contributed to as much as 17% of
the highly publicized annual growth rate in the backlog of applications awaiting first review over
our sample period.26 As such, the welfare implications of this practice are potentially considerable.
By implementing externally imposed deadlines in the first place, the Patent Office has arguably
already taken steps to confront the negative consequences that might arise from employee
procrastination (Arielly and Wertenbroch 2002). That being said, our analysis cannot conclude
whether the quota system that the Patent Office has chosen to implement is suboptimal. It is
possible that the harms associated with examiner procrastination are outweighed by the costs
associated with enforcing work efforts on a more granular level. Such costs could include

25

While we do not find evidence that examiner procrastination directly leads to the issuance of patents that fail to meet the
patentability standards, our previous work found evidence that the Patent Office may grant patents of questionable legal validity in
an effort to decrease its application backlog (Frakes and Wasserman 2015). Thus, to the extent that examiner procrastination
increases delays in processing applications then it may also—albeit indirectly—lead to the issuance of low quality patents and
implicate the host of social welfare harms associated with allowing invalid patents to issue.
26 To arrive at this number, we note that the 12 million in aggregate additional days in review may account for the processing of
roughly 11,000 fewer applications per year in light of the mean number of days of the prosecution period for the individual
applications in our sample (1,128). With the backlog of applications awaiting final review growing by nearly 66,000 per year over
our sample period, this implies that the practice of end-loading on the FOAM may be contributing to roughly 1/6 of the annual
growth rate in the Patent Office’s backlog.
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additional administrative time and effort, loss of flexibility to examiners to efficiently arrange their
work activity, and possible decrease in overall job satisfication. Though hard to quantify, these
latter costs may be meaningful in light of the difficulty the Patent Office may face in in attracting
quality examiners when subjecting examiners to less discretion and more rigid workload goals.
Of course, the Patent Office may have softer, less expensive tools at its disposal than simply
increasing the frequency by which it sets quota expectations, tools which may enable examiners
to retain some of the flexibility of the current system. The Agency, for instance, could attempt to
smooth work by incorporating a measurement of end-loading into the examiner’s performance
apprasial. Alternatively, if the real concern regarding examiner procrastination is its effect on the
quality of patent examination, the Agency could adopt a system where a percentage of end-loaded
applications are subject to further scrutiny by the Patent Office.
Relatedly, while our analysis also suggests that the practice of procrastination and the harms that
ensue from it may intensify following the onset of telecommuting, it may nonetheless be true that
the cost savings from telecommuting outweigh these harms.

The Patent Office touts its

teleworking program as “worth its weight in gold” stating that the program provided over $64.7
million in efficiency benefits to the Patent Office in 2014 alone. 27 These are substantial savings
that should naturally be balanced against any costs stemming from increased examiner
procrastination following the transition to telecommuting.

DUKE UNIVERSITY AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

27

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Telework Annual Report 2015.

37

REFERENCES
Acland, Dan, and Matthew R. Levy, “Naivete, projection bias, and habit formation in gym attendance,”
Management Science 61(1) (2015), 146-60.
Akerlof, George, “Procrastination and Obedience,” American Economic Review 81(2) (1991), 1-19.
Ariely, Dan, and Klaus Wertenbroch, “Procrastination, Deadlines and Performance: Self-Control by
Precommitment,” Psychological Science 13 (2002), 219-24.
Asch, Beth J., “Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters,” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 43 (1990), 89S-106S.
Balasubramanian, Natarajan, Jeongsik Lee and Jagadeesh Sivadasan, “Deadlines, Work Flows, Task
Sorting, and Work Quality,” Management Science (2017, forthcoming).
Bloom, Nicholas, James Liang, John Roberts, and Zhichun Jenny Ying, “Does Working from Home Work?
Evidence from a Chinese Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1) (2015), 165-218.
Bisin, Alberto, and Kyle Hyndman, “Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines in a Field Experiment,”
NBER Working Paper No. 19874 (2014).
Brown, Alexander, Zhikang Eric Chua and Colin .F. Camerer, “Learning and Visceral Temptation in
Dynamic Saving Experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(1) (2009), 197-231.
Cadena, Ximena, Antoinette Schoar, Alexandra Cristea, and Heber M. Delgado-Medrano, “Fighting
Procrastination in the Workplace: An Experiment,” NBER Working Paper No. 16944 (2011).
Chetty, Raj, Emmanuel Saez, and Laszlo Sandor, “What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An
Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
28(3) (2014), 169-88.
Cockburn, I., S. Korum, and S. Stern, “Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics,
and Litigation Outcomes,” in Patents in Knowledge-Based Economy, W. M. Cohen and S.A. Merril
(Eds.), (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003).
Courty, Pascal and Gerald Marshke, “An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance
Incentives,” Journal of Labor Economics, 22 (2004), 23-56.
DellaVigna, Stefano, “Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field,” Journal of Economic
Literature 47(2) (2009), 315-72.
Duflo, Esther, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson, “Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and
Experimental Evidence from Kenya,” American Economic Review 101(6) (2011), 2350-90.
Fischer, Carolyn, “Read This Paper Later: Procrastination with Time–Consistent Preferences,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 46(3) (2001), 249–269.
Frakes, Michael D. and Melissa F. Wasserman, “Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too
Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment,” Stanford Law Review, 67(3) (2015).
---------, “Patent Office Cohorts,” Duke Law Journal 65 (2016), 1601-1655.
38

---------, “Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid
Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
Forthcoming (2017a).
---------, “Empirical Scholarship on the Prosecution Process at the U.S. Patent Office,” in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Volume II—Analytical Methods),
forthcoming (eds. Peter S. Menell and David L. Schwartz) (2017b).
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue, “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2002), 351-401.
Gruber, Jonathan, and Botond Koszegi, “Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116 (4) (2001), 1261-1303.
Kremer, Michael, Supreet Kaur, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Self Control at Work.” Journal of Political
Economy 123 (6) (2015), 1227 - 77.
Laibson, David, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2)
(1997), 443-77.
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman, “Estimating Discount Functions with
Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle,” NBER Working Paper 13314 (2007).
Larkin, Ian, “The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 32 (2014), 199-227.
Lemley, Mark A. and Bhaven Sampat, “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes,” Review of
Economics and Statistics 94(3) (2012), 817–827.
Loewenstein, George, and Jon Elster, Choice Over Time, Russel Sage, New York (1992).
Moser, Petra, “How to Patents Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth Century World’s
Fairs,” American Economic Review 95(4) 2005, 1214-36.
O'Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin, “Doing it Now or Later,” American Economic Review 89(1) (199),
103-124.
--------, “Procrastination on long-term projects,” Journal on Economic Behavior and Organization 66
(2008), 161-75.
Office of Inspector General Report, Abuse of Telework Program at the USPTO, Inspector General Referral
No. PPC-CI-12-1196-H (2014).
--------, USPTO Needs to Strengthen Patent Quality Assurance Practices, OIG-15-026A (April 10, 2015).
Oyer, Paul, “Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1998), 149-185.
Pressman, David & Richard Stim, Nolo’s Patents for Beginners, 8th ed., Berkeley, CA, Nolo (2015)

39

Read, Daniel, George Loewenstein and Shobana Kalyanaraman, “Mixing virtue and vice; combining the
immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12(4)
(1999), 257-73.
Shapiro, Jesse M., “Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle,” Journal
of Public Economics 89 (2005), 303-25.
Sprenger, Charles, “Judging experimental evidence on dynamic inconsistency,” American Economic
Review: Papers & Proceedings 105 (5) (2015), 280-85.

40

TABLE I
Summary Statistics

(1)
MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATION)
Incidence of Application End-loading (First Office Action on the Merits
Completed on Last Day of Quota Period)

0.483
(0.499)
0.114

Incidence of First Office Action Allowance
(0.318)
0.165
Incidence of Non-Final Rejection on Second Office Action
(0.371)
0.713
Incidence of Application Allowance (After Final Disposition)
(0.452)
0.232
Incidence of Request for Continued Examination
(0.422)
0.263
Number of Requests for Continued Examination
(0.616)
1129.263
Examination Duration in Days (Time between Filing and Final Disposition)
(526.622)
0.446
Incidence of U.S. Patent being Allowed at both the JPO and EPO
(0.497)
0.727
Incidence of Large-Entity Applicant
(0.445)
0.071
Incidence of Application being Filed at the EPO or JPO prior to U.S. Filing
(0.258)
0.113
Incidence of Application being Reviewed while Examiner Telecommuting
(0.317)
Statistics are from a sample of 1,741,500 first office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012
(focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001).
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TABLE II
Relationship between End-loading of First Office Actions and First-Office-Action Allowance Rates

End-loaded Application
Dummy

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.108***

-0.104***

-0.104***

-0.022***

0.004

0.002

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.005)

-0.162***

-0.215***

-0.212***

-

-

(0.013)

(0.010)

(0.011)

End-loaded Application
Dummy X ExaminerEnd-loading Rate
Examiner Fixed Effects?

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

Year Effects and Other
Covariates?
Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of 1,741,500
first office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001).
Coefficient of examiner end-loading rate in Column 4 omitted.
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TABLE III
Relationship between End-loading of First Office Actions and Various Future Outcomes of Application
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

INCIDENCE OF SECOND-OFFICE

INCIDENCE OF ULTIMATE ALLOWANCE

INCIDENCE OF APPLICATION BEING

ACTION NON-FINAL REJECTION

OF APPLICATION

ALLOWED AT BOTH THE EPO AND JPO

End-loaded
0.037***

0.019***

0.014***

-0.045***

-0.018***

-0.018***

-0.004*

-0.006***

-0.006***

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

Application
Dummy
Examiner
Fixed
Effects?
Year Effects
and Other
Covariates?
Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of 1,741,500 first office
actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001). Estimates in Columns 7-9 are
from a sub-sample of this initial sample, focusing on those application that culminated in an allowance at the U.S. Patent Office and whose
underlying inventions were also the subject of an application at both the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office.
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TABLE IV
Relationship between End-loading of Applications and Various Other Outcomes and Measures
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

FALSIFICATION EXERCISES
EXAMINATION DURATION ANALYSIS (LENGTH OF TOTAL
(IMMUTABLE APPLICATION
EXAMINATION PERIOD)
CHARACTERISTICS)
LOG NUMBER
INCIDENCE OF

LOG

DURATION IN

FOREIGN

DURATION OF

DAYS OF

ENTITY SIZE

PRIORITY

EXAMINATION

EXAMINATION

OF APPLICANT

STATUS OF

PERIOD

PERIOD

OF REQUESTS

REQUEST FOR
FOR

CONTINUED
CONTINUED
EXAMINATION

APPLICANT

EXAMINATION

End-loaded
0.024***

0.120***

0.049***

49.394***

0.002**

0.001**

(0.001)

(0.005)

(0.001)

(1.336)

(0.001)

(0.000)

Application
Dummy
Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of 1,741,500 first
office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001). All regressions
include examiner and year effects and various covariates.
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TABLE V
Relationship between Examiner Telecommuting and the Differential in Various Measures between End-loaded and Non-Endloaded Applications
(1)

(2)

Ultimate Allowance of
Allowance on FOAM
Application
-0.094***

-0.019***

(0.003)

(0.001)

-0.008*

-0.012***

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.006

-0.006

(0.005)

(0.004)

0.017***

-0.012***

(0.005)

(0.005)

0.026***

-0.008

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.060***

0.007

(0.007)

(0.006)

0.074***

0.013**

(0.008)

(0.006)

0.080***

0.017***

(0.009)

(0.006)

0.092***

0.028***

(0.010)

(0.007)

0.080***

0.033***

(0.012)

(0.008)

0.024***

0.010***

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.008*

0.002

End-loaded Application

(Omitted: > 4 Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy)

4-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

3-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

2-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

1-Year Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

Year Starting Telecommuting Dummy

1-Year Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

2-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

3-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

>= 4-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

(Omitted: > 4 Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy X
End-loaded Application)
4-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
3-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
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Application
2-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
1-Year Prior to Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
Year Starting Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
1-Year Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
2-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
3-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy X End-loaded
Application
>= 4-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy X
End-loaded Application

(0.005)

(0.003)

-0.004

0.005

(0.005)

(0.003)

-0.023***

-0.002

(0.005)

(0.003)

-0.064***

-0.011***

(0.006)

(0.004)

-0.094***

-0.013***

(0.007)

(0.004)

-0.122***

-0.014***

(0.008)

(0.005)

-0.163***

-0.017***

(0.010)

(0.006)

-0.178***

-0.027***

(0.013)

(0.007)

Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of 1,741,500 first
office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001). All regressions
include examiner and year effects and various covariates.
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TABLE VI
Relationship between End-loaded Applications and Various Application Outcomes: Instrumental Variables Estimates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Ultimate

Second-Office-

Examination

Allowance of

Action Non-Final

Duration (in

Application

Rejection

Days)

-0.076***

-0.022***

0.010***

34.55***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(1.99)

FOAM
Allowance

End-loaded Application Dummy

Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of
1,741,500 first office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after
March, 2001). The indicator variable representing whether or not the application’s first office action was reviewed on the
last day of the quota period is instrumented by the examiner’s mean end-loading rate among all applications that they
reviewed during the given year (not considering the contribution of the application at hand). All regressions include
examiner fixed effects, year fixed effects and various controls representing characteristics of the application and examiner.
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FIGURE I
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Density
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Frequency Distribution of First-Office-Action Reviews across Individual Days in 2010
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Date of Completion of First Office Action on the Merits
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Notes: Frequency counts are from the universe of FOAMs completed during the course of 2010 and
were obtained from the Transaction History File of the Patent Office’s PAIR database.
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FIGURE II
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Frequency Distribution of First-Office-Action Reviews by Days Prior to End of Bi-Weekly Quotas
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5
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Days During Bi-Weekly Observation Period

15

Notes: Frequency counts are from the universe of FOAMs completed during the course of 2001-2012
and were obtained from the Transaction History File of the Patent Office’s PAIR database.

49

FIGURE III
Event Study Analysis: Relationship between Examiner Telecommuting and the Likelihood that First Office
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Actions are Completed on the Last Day of the Quota Period
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4

Event Time (Years Leading up to and Following Start of Telecommuting)
Differential Endloading Rate: Confidence Interval

Differential Endloading Rate: Mean

Note: this figure presents coefficients from a regression of the incidence of an application’s FOAM being
end-loaded on a series of dummy variables representing leads and lags of the associated examiner’s
commencement of telecommuting (if at all). The regression includes year and examiner effects and
covariates representing various characteristics of the applications. Standard errors are clustered at the
examiner level. Estimates are from a sample of 1,741,500 first office actions completed between March,
2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001).
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ONLINE APPENDIX

PROCRASTINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. PATENT
OFFICE

MICHAEL D. FRAKES AND MELISSA F. WASSERMAN
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Details on Docket Management Process
In addition to meeting production quotas, patent examiners are also expected to meet workflow or
docket management goals. The workflow or docket management goals seek to ensure that the
flow of patent applications through the examination process align with prescribed time periods set
by the Patent Office. Patent examiners have five different dockets of patent applications, wherein
each docket contains patent examinations in a different stage of review. More specifically, these
five dockets include: (1) new patent applications; (2) patent applications which have been amended
in response to an office action; (3) patent application for which a final office action has been sent;
(4) patent application in which a supervisor has issued a correction; (5) patent application on an
accelerated examination schedule. Each docket has an “expected average days” for completion.
Once a patent application is docketed, a clock begins to count down from the expected average
days for review for that docket. Examiners are expected to complete review of an application
before its workflow clock expires. As a result, examiners must meet both production quotas—
complete a certain number of work credits every bi week—and workflow goals—complete stages
of examination review in certain timeframes. Notably, workflow goals largely align with
production quotas. That is, the expected average days for completion overwhelmingly expire at
the end of a production bi-week. Thus, we refer to the quota in our paper to encompass both
production and workflow goals.
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Model of Patent Examiner Behavior
A) Time-consistent benchmark
As a starting point, given the role of quotas in personnel outcomes at the Patent Office, we
assume that patent examiners will be incentivized to hit their bi-weekly (and quarterly) production
targets.28 The question facing us is how they space out their work efforts over the observation
period to reach this target. One can readily predict that a time-consistent examiner that is
motivated as such will reach her goals while roughly smoothing her work efforts evenly throughout
the observation period. For these purposes, we set forth a model inspired by Fischer (2001), which
is well suited for our needs in that it contemplates a situation where the execution of a task requires
a number of hours to complete, where those hours can be spread out over a designated period of
time. With this model, we attempt to predict the time path that a rational, time-consistent patent
examiner will follow over the course of the 10 working days in a bi-week period.
On any given day, examiners receive utility of u(24-h) for receiving 24-h hours of leisure, where
h represents the number of hours spent that day reviewing applications and where u is strictly
increasing and concave. Examiners are expected to spend 80 hours over the bi-week reviewing
applications, though are not obligated to spend 8 hours each day on such tasks. We assume
however, that they are monitored enough that they spend greater than 0 hours per day on
examinations (to avoid discussing the other corner solution possibility, we also assume that
examiners will not spend the full 24 hours of any given day reviewing applications). Βt represents
the exponential discount factor. Examiners select the amount of time spent reviewing applications
on each of the 10 working days in the bi-week (h0, h1, …h9) by solving the following:

28

This assumption is supported by our interviews with examiners and former Supervisory Patent Examiner.
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9

𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑈 = ∑ 𝑢(24 − ℎ𝑖 ) 𝛽 𝑡
ℎ0 , ℎ1 , … ℎ9 ∈ (0, 24)
𝑡=0

s.t.
9

∑ ℎ𝑡 = 80
𝑡=0

The first order conditions from this problem suggest the following relationship:29
u’(24-h0) = u’(24-h1)β = … = u’(24-h9)β9

(1)

For any β < 1, in light of the concavity of u, it is readily apparent from these first order conditions
that the number of hours selected will increase to some extent over time as the 10th day approaches.
The following equation demonstrates the degree to which hours worked change over time:30
(1 − 𝛽)
ℎ𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑢′ (24 − ℎ𝑡 )
≈
(
)
ℎ𝑡
𝛽
−𝑢"(24 − ℎ𝑡 ) ∗ ℎ𝑡

(2)

The first term on the right simply captures the degree to which examiners prefer the present. If
examiners do not discount at all over this short time period, this term equals zero and examiners
do not change their hours day-by-day and instead smooth their work efforts over time. The second
term captures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for leisure (EIS). Essentially, whatever
change in the temporal work path brought about by general time preferences is mediated by the
degree to which examiners will entertain deviating from a smooth leisure profile over time.
Noting that the literature generally estimates an EIS of less than 1, Fischer (2001) conservatively
assumes an EIS of 1 and thereafter suggests that a daily change in hours worked of just 1% would

This follows naturally from the fact that each first order conditions suggests u’(24-ht)βt = λ, for each t.
To derive this equation, we follow Fischer (2001) and start with the observation that u”(24-ht) ≈ -Δu’(24-ht) / Δht = -( u’(24-ht+1)u’(24-ht)) / (ht+1 – ht). From this, we derive (ht+1 – ht) / ht = --( u’(24-ht+1)-u’(24-ht) ) / u”(24-ht)ht. The next step is to replace the
numerator of the right-hand-side of this preceding equation. For these purposes, we note that the first order conditions from the
above maximization problem suggests: u’(24-ht)βt = u’(24-ht+1)βt+1= βt+1 (u’(24-ht+1) – u’(24-ht)) + βt+1 (u’(24-ht). Reorganizing,
this suggests that u’(24-ht+1) – u’(24-ht) = ((βt - βt+1) / βt+1 ) * u’(24-ht). Inserting this into the above equation, we find: (ht+1 – ht) /
ht = -((1 – β) / β) * ( u’(24-ht) / (u”(24-ht)*ht)) = ((1 – β) / β) * ( u’(24-ht) / (-u”(24-ht)*ht)).
29
30
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require an annual rate of time preference (

(1−𝛽)
𝛽

) of 3800% or an annual β of a staggeringly low

0.026.31 If instead one assumes a perhaps more reasonable annual β of 0.75, this analysis would
suggest a near 0% daily increase in hours worked—i.e., a smooth time path in work effort over
relatively short periods of time.32 Accordingly, we predict that a patent examiner that discounts
future utility exponentially and that has time-consistent preferences will tend to smooth her work
efforts near evenly over the bi-week observation period (a prediction that is intuitive in light of the
assumed concavity in utility for leisure).
B) Time-Inconsistent Predictions
The above framework can be extended to introduce sources of time-inconsistency in behaviors.
For instance, examiners might discount future leisure in a quasi-hyperbolic manner (Laibson
1997). That is, an examiner at time 0 may discount leisure at time 1 at Bδ, leisure at time 2 at B2δ,
and so on and so forth; essentially, in this framework, the examiner wants to discount tomorrow’s
leisure by Bδ, even though the examiner today wants her future self to follow normal, exponential
discounting at Bt thereafter. The time inconsistency in behavior arises because tomorrow’s
examiner—when tomorrow arrives—will likewise tend to assign that additional δ discount for all
periods beyond that date. Modifying the above framework to incorporate a present bias of this
nature, examiners at time t solve the following:
9−𝑡

𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑈 = 𝑢(24 − ℎ𝑡 ) + ∑ 𝑢(24 − ℎ𝑡+𝑖 ) 𝛽 𝑖 δ
ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡+1 , … ℎ9 ∈ (0, 24)
𝑖=1

s.t.

O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) provide a similar discussion.
While the discount rate implied by an assumed 1% change in daily work effort may not comport with our expectations of general
exponential time preferences, consider the discount rates implied by the degree of work effort changes we actually observe. In our
analysis below, we find that nearly half of the work effort is completed at the end of the bi-week period suggesting as much as a
10% daily change in hours worked, which, under the same assumptions, would suggest an annual β of essentially 0 (reflecting a
near complete preference for the present). This is possible but unlikely in the face of a rational, exponential discounter.
31
32
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10−𝑡

∑ ℎ𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡 = 80
𝑖=1

where St represents the inherited stock of hours worked from hours worked decisions in the time
periods prior to t (h1 + h2 + … ht-1). Assuming that examiners are naïve hyperbolic discounters
that are not aware in time t of the fact that examiners at time t+1 will also attach the additional δ
discount factor to periods t+2 and beyond, it is straightforward (based on the above analysis) to
show that the first order conditions from this problem imply the following:
u’(24-h0) = u’(24-h1)βδ = … = u’(24-h9)β9δ

(3)

which suggests:
(1 − 𝛽δ)
ℎ1 − ℎ0
𝑢′ (24 − ℎ0 )
≈
(
)
ℎ0
𝛽δ
−𝑢"(24 − ℎ0 ) ∗ ℎ0

(4)

With the presence of δ, which often is thought to capture a substantial degree of discounting of
tomorrow, the degree to which examiners would discount time 1 at time 0 may now be
considerable enough that one would predict a notable increase in the hours worked between today
and tomorrow (as distinct from the discussion above).33 The remainder of equation (3) suggests
that the planned rate of change in hours worked over time from period 2 onwards will follow the
rule set forth in equation (2) above. Of course, when period 2 arrives, the examiner will again
apply a present bias in her optimization problem at that time, suggesting an hours worked amount
in period 2 less than what she plans to apply in period 3, and so on and so forth. The implication
of this pattern is that examiners will end-load their work efforts at the deadline, assuming again
that examiners are ultimately motivated to hit their 80 hours per bi-week requirement of work.

33

For instance, if one assumes a δ of 0.75 (again assuming an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1), one would expect a
roughly 1/3 increase in work effort between time 0 and time 1.
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In a companion to her 2001 paper, Fischer (2001) extends this framework to allow for a
sophisticated hyperbolic discounter who, at time t, decides on her current hours allocation knowing
that her future self tomorrow will likewise incorporate a δ discount between tomorrow and the
next day. Interestingly, Fischer’s model predicts an even greater degree of procrastination to the
extent that a worker today knows that her future selves will heavily prioritize current leisure,
thereby encouraging her to work even less today in order to force her future selves to work more.
Accordingly, while time-consistent examiners will tend to spread their work out evenly over the
observation period, examiners with present-biased preferences (or examiners who exhibit
differentially discounting) will tend to delay their initial intentions to begin working towards their
bi-weekly goal and cluster their work near the deadline. In the first exercise of our empirical
analysis below, we test for the presence of procrastination by first assessing whether examiners
indeed bunch their work product around the end of the bi-weekly (and quarterly) quotas.

Additional references:
Fischer, Carolyn, “Read This Paper Even Later: Procrastination with Time–Inconsistent Preferences,” RFF
Discussion Paper 99–20 (2001).
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End-loading Heterogeneity
To complement our demonstration of average end-loading in application reviews, we consider the
possibility of heterogeneity in end-loading practices across examiners. To the extent this endloading is indeed reflective of procrastination, we acknowledge that not all examiners are likely to
exhibit the same degree of time inconsistency in work efforts. To assess the degree of
heterogeneity in such behaviors, we calculate the mean rates by which each examiner completed
a FOAM on the last day of a quota period and then present the distribution of these mean rates
across examiners in Figure A1. Though there is considerable variance in end-loading rates across
examiners, Figure A1 does demonstrate that the vast majority of examiners exhibit some striking
degree of end-of-period clustering of reviews. Even at the 20th percentile of examiners (ranked
according to their end-loading tendencies), nearly 35 percent of FOAMs reviewed fell on the last
day of the quota period. If examiners were to smooth their workload over the 10 business days
inherent in the bi-week period, one would instead expect to observe only 10 percent of applications
being processed on the final day.
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FIGURE A1
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Notes: this histogram is derived from a sample of 9,639 examiners completing first office actions
represented in the Patent Office’s PAIR database between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (for applications
filed after March, 2001).
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FIGURE A2
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Notes: Frequency counts are from the universe of second office actions completed during the course of
2010 and were obtained from the Transaction History File of the Patent Office’s PAIR database.
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FIGURE A3
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Notes: Frequency counts are from the universe of third office actions completed during the course of 2010
and were obtained from the Transaction History File of the Patent Office’s PAIR database.
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FIGURE A4
Generalized Bi-Weekly Histogram of FOAM Counts by NBER Technology Sub-Category
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TABLE A1
Relationship between Examiner Telecommuting and the Likelihood that First Office Actions Are
Completed on the Last Day of the Quota Period: Event-Study Results

(1)

(2)

(Omitted: > 4 Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy)
0.002
0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.009*
0.008
3-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.014**
0.010*
2-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.010
0.003
1-Year Prior to Telecommuting Dummy
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.072***
0.065***
Year Starting Telecommuting Dummy
(0.008)
(0.008)
0.051***
0.046***
1-Year Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy
(0.009)
(0.009)
0.021**
0.016*
2-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy
(0.009)
(0.009)
0.017
0.011
3-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy
(0.010)
(0.010)
0.001
-0.003
>= 4-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy
(0.012)
(0.012)
Examiner and Year Fixed Effects?
YES
YES
Other Covariates?
NO
YES
Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates
are from a sample of 1,741,500 first office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012
(focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001).
4-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy
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TABLE A2
Mean Rates of End-loading of First-Office Actions on the Merits at Quota-Period Ends, Separately by
Examiner Status

End-loading Rate

(2)

(3)

APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY
THOSE WITHOUT SIGNATORY
AUTHORITY

APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY
THOSE WITH SIGNATORY
AUTHORITY

0.532
(0.498)

0.436
(0.495)

Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis. Statistics are from a sample of 1,741,500 first office actions completed
between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed after March, 2001). Examiners with GeneralSchedule pay levels below GS-13 need supervisory approval on the first office actions that they submit, while those
above GS-13 need no such approval.
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TABLE A3
Falsification Tests. Relationship between Examiner Telecommuting and Certain Immutable Characteristics of the Application:
Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
(1)

(2)
Incidence of Previous

Incidence of Large Entity
Filing at the EPO or JPO
Applicant (Mean = 0.72)
(Mean = 0.06)
(Omitted: > 4 Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy)
-0.002

-0.002*

(0.002)

(0.001)

-0.000

-0.003**

(0.003)

(0.001)

-0.002

-0.003**

(0.003)

(0.001)

-0.006*

-0.005***

(0.003)

(0.001)

-0.002

-0.004**

(0.004)

(0.002)

0.001

-0.006**

(0.004)

(0.002)

0.002

-0.006**

(0.005)

(0.002)

0.004

-0.006**

(0.005)

(0.003)

0.005

-0.008**

(0.006)

(0.003)

NO

YES

4-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

3-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

2-Years Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

1-Year Prior to Telecommuting Dummy

Year Starting Telecommuting Dummy

1-Year Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

2-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

3-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

>= 4-Years Post Starting Telecommuting Dummy

Examiner and Year Fixed Effects and Other
Covariates?
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Standard deviations are indicated in parenthesis and are clustered at the examiner level. Estimates are from a sample
of 1,741,500 first office actions completed between March, 2001 and July, 2012 (focusing only on applications filed
after March, 2001). All regressions include examiner and year effects.
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